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COMMENTS
JURISDICTIONAL BASES OF MARITIME CLAIMS
FOUNDED ON ACTS OF CONGRESS
GERALD WETHERINGTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 24, 1959, the Supreme Court of the United States
held in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.' that a cause of
action invoking principles of the general maritime law2 is not within the
federal question jurisdiction conferred on United States district courts
by the Judiciary Act of 1875.1 The Court thereby settled an important
issue concerning the construction of this statute, but did so in terms which
give rise to another question regarding its scope.4
In his opinion for the majority, Mr. Justice Frankfurter argued
that Congress did not intend to include "cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction" within the federal question jurisdiction conferred by the
Judiciary Act of 1875, now section 1331 of the Judicial Code., Did he
* Member of the Florida Bar; LL.B., Duke University Law School, 1963.
1. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
2. The "general" maritime law in the United States, insofar as it remains unmodified
by statute, contains, then, two parts. First and by far the most important, is the
corpus of traditional rules and concepts found by our courts in the Eupropean
authorities, and applied here with no more variation than is normal when purportedly
identical bodies of law are applied in decision by courts in different cultural ambients
without common appellate review (cf. the "common law" in England and Kansas).
Second are rules and concepts improvised to fit the needs of this country, including,
of course, modifications of the first component. GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF
ADMIRALTY 42 (1957) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
The general maritime law is federal law, with the possible exception of instances where states
have been permitted to "supplement" it. See Romero supra note 1, at 374, n.42; GILMORE &
BLACK §§ 1-17, 1-18.
3. Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. This act, with increased requirements of
jurisdictional amount and minor modifications in language, which do not change its mean-
ing, is now 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958). See Reviser's Note to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 28 U.S.C. § 1331
provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." The jurisdiction
conferred by § 1331 is called general federal question jurisdiction since it extends, with
certain exceptions, to cases involving questions of federal as opposed to state law. Con-
gress has made specific provision for cases arising under certain classes of statutes, e.g.,
acts relating to patents, copyrights and trademarks. When specific provision is made, the
jurisdictional amount of § 1331 is normally not required. In addition, Congress has incor-
porated jurisdictional grants in the body of certain regulatory statutes. See generally
MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE JUDICIAL CODE 135-48 (1949).
4. For a discussion of the significance of the Romero case with respect to federal juris-
diction in general see Kurland, The Romero Case and Some Problems of Federal Jurisdiction,
73 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1960).
5. 358 U.S. 354, 378: "When we apply to the statute, and to the clause of Article III
from which it is derived, commonsensical and lawyerlike modes of construction, and the
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mean that all "cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" were ex-
cluded from the grant of section 1331?6 If so, the Romero case provides
authority for a surprising proposition: Section 1331 of the Judicial Code
does not grant jurisdiction over maritime claims based on acts of Con-
gress .
7
Such an interpretation of section 1331, which grants to federal
district courts jurisdiction over cases arising under the "laws of the United
States," would violate the "plain meaning" rule of statutory construction
and, as will be shown, would be opposed to the weight of authority.
Therefore, a careful analysis of Justice Frankfurter's opinion must be
made before such an interpretation can be attributed to it.
In addition to the Romero case, several cases, including Supreme
Court cases, have touched upon the question of whether the jurisdiction
conferred by section 1331 extends to admiralty claims founded on acts
of Congress.
Before examining the Romero opinion, however, and the other cases
relevant to the issue in question, some preliminary observations are
necessary.
Federal district courts have two principal branches of civil juris-
diction. One is frequently called a jurisdiction at law or a common-law
jurisdiction and embraces cases which involve diversity of citizenship
evidence of history and logic, it becomes clear that the words of that statute do not extend,
and could not reasonably be interpreted to extend, to cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction." See also 358 U.S. at 367 n.23.
6. Cases arising under federal statutes which modify and are incorporated into the
maritime law are maritime cases for purposes of federal jurisdiction. Panama R.R. v.
Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924). Congress has paramount power to determine the maritime
law which shall prevail throughout the country under Article III, section 2 of the Con-
stitution, which extends the judicial power of the United States "to all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction" and Article I, section 8, which gives Congress power to make all
laws "necessary and proper" for carrying into execution all powers "vested by this Con-
stitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
The Thomas Barnum, 293 U.S. 21, 42 (1934). Federal maritime statutes include, e.g., the
Jones Act, quoted infra note 18. See generally BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 32 (1940) (with
cumulative supplement).
7. One commentator on Romero has said:
This result was based principally upon statutory construction of Section 1331 of the
Judicial Code, which confers "arising under" jurisdiction, thus foreclosing any at-
tempt to distinguish the instant case should maritime causes of action based upon
federal statute be urged as a grounds for jurisdiction at law. . . . Relying upon
conventional statutory construction techniques, the court has ended, presumably
forever, any contention that admiralty or maritime matters are within the proper
construction of the "arising under" grant of jurisdiction at law of sec. 1331 of the
Judicial Code. Note, 45 IOWA L. REV. 632, 634, 639 (1960).
Other commentators on Romero, however, have interpreted Justice Frankfurter's opinion as
extending only to maritime claims based on the general maritime law. Currie, The Silver Oar
and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U. CHr. L. REV. 1, 13-14, 37 (1959); Kurland,
supra note 4, at 825; Note, 13 STAN. L. REV. 321, 337 (1961); Note, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 500
(1959).
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or present some federal question.' The other is called an admiralty juris-
diction and embraces all maritime claims.9
These two jurisdictions are separate but not always mutually ex-
clusive.'" Many maritime claims can be brought at law under the "saving
clause" of section 1333 of the Judicial Code, if supported by a non-
maritime grant of federal jurisdiction." This category includes mari-
time claims wherein the suitor is seeking a common-law remedy such as
damages.' 2 When a case involving such claims is brought under the
8. See generally MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE RULES AND OFFICIAL FORMS § 2 (1961).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise en-
titled." One court outlined the principal subject matter included within this jurisdiction as fol-
lows: "The admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts embraces two principal subjects-
maritime contracts and maritime torts. The latter . . . are civil wrongs committed on
navigable waters. The place where torts are committed, and not their nature, is decisive
on the question of admiralty jurisdiction. The Belfast v. Boon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624,
637." Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. City of New York, 135 F.2d 443, 446 (2d
Cir. 1943). In Romero, Justice Frankfurter declared: "All suits involving maritime claims,
regardless of the remedy sought, are cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction within the
meaning of Article III whether they are asserted in the federal courts or, under the saving
clause, in the state courts." 358 U.S. at 367 n.23.
10. "The statutes, the Rules of Civil Procedure, and the decisions of the courts all
clearly recognize that jurisdiction in admiralty is quite separate and apart from jurisdiction
at law. Admiralty is still a separate field of law and has its own rules, methods, and pro-
cedure." Rowley v. Sierra S.S. Co., 48 F. Supp. 193, 195 (N.D. Ohio 1942). For a rigid ap-
plication of the theory of separate jurisdictions see Higa v. Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d
780 (9th Cir. 1955), discussed in Currie, supra note 7, at 36-38.11. In § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 76, 77, Congress provided: "the
district courts . . . shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ...saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a com-
mon law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it . . . ." This provision is
now found in somewhat altered language in 28 U.S.C. § 1333, quoted supra note 9. At the
time of the adoption of the Constitution, suitors could enforce certain maritime claims in
state common law courts. That right was preserved by the above "saving to suitors"
clause. The federal courts, upon the creation of their common-law jurisdiction, were, accord-
ing to most authorities, given the right to hear saving clause cases if independent grounds
of federal common-law jurisdiction, such as diversity of citizenship, should appear. See 1
BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 20 (1940); GILMORE & BLACK § 1-13. Cases upholding federal com-
mon-law jurisdiction when diversity of citizenship is shown include: Romero, supra note 1;
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 88-89 (1946); Leon v. Galceran, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 185 (1870). Judge Dimock's concurring opinion in Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen
Kabushiki Kaisha, 221 F.2d 615, 619 (2d Cir. 1955), has been interpreted as holding that
federal district courts have no common-law jurisdiction over saving clause cases, even when
diversity of citizenship is present. See Currie, supra note 7, at 23 n.98; Note, 24 FORDHAM L.
REv. 691, 692 (1956); Note, 28 FoRDHAm L. Rav. 350 (1959), Comment, 32 TUL. L. REV.
696, 700 (1958).
12. "Examination of the legislative history of the Judiciary Act of 1789 does not disclose
precisely what its framers had in mind when in section 9 they used the phrase 'common law
remedy.'" C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 148-49 (1943). However, it has been
determined that, "the common law is as competent as the admiralty to give a remedy in all
cases where the suit is in personam against the owner of the property." Leon v. Galceran, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 185, 191 (1870). Further, "The 'right of a common-law remedy' . . . includes
remedies in pais, as well as proceedings in court; judicial remedies conferred by statute, as
well as those existing at the common law; remedies in equity, as well as those enforceable
in a court of law." Red Cross Lines v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 123-24 (1924).
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district court's common-law jurisdiction, it is properly called, for juris-
dictional purposes, a common-law case and not an admiralty case.'8
Why would a litigant want to bring his maritime claims at law rather
than in admiralty? The answer lies in the different procedures used at
law and in admiralty. Cases at law are governed by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which normally provide the right of jury trial.' 4 In ad-
miralty, however, special Admiralty Rules apply and the court normally
determines questions of fact. 1" Litigants often want a jury, especially
in personal injury cases, because federal juries are usually more gen-
erous than federal judges in awarding damages.
However, the practical problem of whether a party can get a jury
in cases arising under federal maritime statutes has been solved by Con-
gress in the statutes themselves. 6 In addition, most federal maritime
statutes prescribe the courts and procedures to be used in adjudicating
actions arising under them.
Yet there are definite elements of practical significance in the ques-
tion of whether suits invoking such statutes fall within the district court's
general federal question jurisdiction. For example, are actions under
the Jones Act subject to the jurisdictional amount required by section
1331?18 Can cases brought in state courts under the Carriage of Goods
Where the claim asserted is in the nature of a maritime lien, enforceable in admiralty by
in rem process only a court of admiralty may take jurisdiction. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 411 (1867); The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1867).
13. In Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638, 648 (1900) the Court said:
The true distinction between such proceedings as are and such as are not invasions
of the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction is this: If the cause of action be one cogni-
zable in admiralty, and the suit be in rem against the thing itself, though a monition
be also issued to the owner, the proceeding is essentially one in admiralty. If, upon
the other hand, the cause of action be not one of which a court of admiralty has
jurisdiction, or if the suit be in personam against an individual defendant, with an
auxiliary attachment against a particular thing, or against the property of the
defendant in general, it is essentially a proceeding according to the course of the
common law, and within the saving clause of the statute (sec. 563) of a common
law remedy.
According to one commentator, "A maritime action brought under the saving clause is
'a suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity.' If it were a suit in admiralty it could not be
brought in a state court. Cf. 28 U.S.C. sec. 71 (1940)." Currie, supra note 7, at 16 n.57.
See also Stamp v. Union Stevedoring Corp., 11 F.2d 172, 174 (E.D. Pa. 1925).
14. FED. R. Csv. P. 1, 38.
15. For an excellent discussion of the nature and importance of the different pro-
cedures used at law and in admiralty, see Currie, supra note 7.
16. "It is also significant that in the entire history of federal maritime legislation,
whether before the passage of the Act of 1875 (e.g., the Great Lakes Act-also a general
jurisdictional statute and one often termed an anomaly in the maritime law because of its jury
trial provision) or after (the Jones Act), Congress has not once left the availability of a
trial on the law side to inference. It has made specific provision." Frankfurter, J., in
Romero, 358 U.S. at 371. One notable exception to the above statement is the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1958).
17. See, e.g., the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1958).
18. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958). This act provides:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may,
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by Sea Act be removed to federal district courts?19 Must an action brought
at law in a federal district court under the Death on the High Seas Act
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction?2" The answers to these and other
questions depend in part on whether the federal courts have general fed-
eral question jurisdiction over maritime actions based on acts of Congress.
II. THE ROMERO OPINION
Romero was a Spanish subject who was injured on a Spanish ship
berthed in the Port of New York. He filed suit on the law side of the
federal district court for the southern district of New York." The com-
plaint named four defendants. Claims under the Jones Act, for unsea-
worthiness22 and for maintenance and cure2" were made against Com-
pania Transatlantica, a Spanish corporation which owned the ship. The
same claims were brought against Garcia & Diaz, a New York corpora-
tion acting as the ship's husbanding agent while it was in the Port of New
York, with the addition of a claim for simple maritime tort. Claims for
at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by
jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the
common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees
shall apply .... Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the district
in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located.
See generally GILMORE & BLACK LAW OF ADMIRALTY ch. VI (1957).
19. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1958). For discussion of this act, see generally, GILMORE &
BLAcK ch. III. Removal from state to federal courts of suits based on federal law is
authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1958), which provides:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on
a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States
shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.
Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such
action is brought.
As will be seen subsequently, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act has been held to be
within the jurisdiction conferred by § 1337 rather than that conferred by § 1331. Section
1337 confers federal question jurisdiction over a special class of cases, those based on acts
regulating commerce. The important difference between § 1337 and § 1331 is that the former
dispenses with the requirement of jurisdictional amount.
20. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1958). This act provides that proceedings under it can be
brought only in admiralty. In criticizing Higa v. Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780 (9th Cir.
1955), which held that the district court had no jurisdiction of a suit at law under the
Death on the High Seas Act, Professor Currie observes:
[T]he case was within the jurisdiction of the "law side" of the district court because
it was one arising under the laws of the United States, cognizable under Section
1331 of the Judicial Code .... True, the act of Congress provides for a proceeding
in admiralty, but it creates the right of action, which did not exist under the general
maritime law, and the case presented a substantial question relating to the construc-
tion and application of the act. Currie, supra note 7, at 37.
21. 142 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). For a detailed analysis of the case see Currie,
The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1959).
22. The general maritime law imposes liability on a shipowner for injuries caused to
seamen by an unseaworthy ship. For a discussion of the scope of this liability, see generally
GiuMoRE & BLACK § 6-38.
23. The shipowner's liability for maintenance and cure resembles in certain ways that
of an employer subject to a workmen's compensation act. See generally GLMORE & BLACK
§ 6-6.
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maritime tort were also made against International Terminal Operating
Company, a Delaware corporation, and Quinn Lumber Company, a New
York corporation. Jurisdiction was urged under the Jones Act, and under
sections 1331 and 1332 of the Judicial Code. 4 The district court dismissed
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction; the court of appeals affirmed.25
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of a conflict among
the courts of appeals as to proper construction of section 1331. On the
issue of jurisdiction the Court held as follows: (1) The district court had
jurisdiction to determine whether a cause of action had been stated under
the Jones Act; (2) The claims based on the general maritime law were
not cognizable under section 1331; (3) The actions for unseaworthiness
and maintenance and cure could be heard by virtue of the doctrine of
"pendent jurisdiction," since the district court had jurisdiction of the
Jones Act claims; (4) "Since the Jones Act provides an independent
basis of federal jurisdiction over the non-diverse respondent ... the rule
of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267, does not require dismissal of the
claims against the diverse respondents.) 27
In reaching the above conclusions, the Court was not faced with
the contention that section 1331 extended to maritime claims based on
federal statutes. It is difficult, therefore, to ascertain whether by using
the broad phrase "cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" in con-
nection with its holding under section 1331 the Court meant to include
statutory maritime claims. In light of this, the best way to determine
whether Romero can be considered authority for excluding such claims
from the jurisdiction conferred by this statute is to examine the Court's
discussion of section 1331 in connection with the nonstatutory maritime
claims presented as well as its treatment of the Jones Act claims involved.
Concerning the Jones Act, the Court held that the district court had
jurisdiction at law over the action under the Jones Act against the non-
diverse defendant, thereby determining that Jones Act claims can be
brought under the district court's federal question jurisdiction. Does
this not conclusively establish that cases resting on federal maritime
statutes are section 1331 cases? Unfortunately it does not. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter made no mention of section 1331 in connection with the
Jones Act claim in question; therefore, the opinion could be interpreted
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1958) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 exclusive of interest
and costs, and is between: (1) Citizens of different States; (2) Citizens of a State,
and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof; and (3) Citizens of different States
and in which foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties ....
25. 224 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1957).
26. 355 U.S. 807. In addition, the Court wanted to settle an important conflict-of-laws
question raised by one of the Jones Act claims involved in the case. See Romero, 358 U.S. at
358.
27. 358 U.S. at 381.
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as holding that the district court's jurisdiction was conferred by provi-
sions in the Jones Act itself. Under this interpretation, it could still be
maintained that the Court considered section 1331 as not extending to
maritime claims based on federal statutes.
The Court next made several arguments in support of its holding
that section 1331 did not confer jurisdiction over Romero's claims based
on the general maritime law. Do these arguments force the conclusion that
statutory maritime claims also are excepted from the grant of section
1331?
The Court began its analysis of this issue by stating that Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's decision in American Ins. Co. v. Canter" had established
the climate of opinion under which Congress acted when passing the
Judiciary Act of 1875.29 In that case Marshall declared:
A case in admiralty does not, in fact, arise under the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States. These cases are as old
as navigation itself; and the law, admiralty and maritime, as it
has existed for ages, is applied by our courts to the cases as they
arise.30
As revealed by this passage, Marshall was concerned only with non-
statutory maritime cases. Therefore, even if Congress acted with Mar-
shall's interpretation in mind, this does not show that statutory maritime
claims were excluded from the grant contained in the Judiciary Act of
1875.
Justice Frankfurter next maintained that since one of the principal
purposes in enacting the Act of 1875 was to provide a federal forum
for federally created rights, maritime claims could not be considered
within its scope because these claims had been enforceable in federal
courts since 1789." This argument seems to apply with equal force to
both statutory and nonstatutory maritime claims. But it does not com-
pel the conclusion that Congress intended to except maritime claims based
on federal statutes from the reach of section 1331. On the contrary, it is
reasonable to conclude that Congress in this statute made a distinction
between statutory and nonstatutory maritime actions. The word "laws"
is usually held to include statutes. On notable occasion, however, courts
and presumably legislatures have understood "laws" not to embrace
judge-made rules.2
28. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
29. 358 U.S. at 365-67. The Romero case did not deny Congressional authority to
confer federal question jurisdiction over claims based on the general maritime law. "The
decision is not a construction of Article III of the Constitution and is not placed on
constitutional grounds. The authority of Congress to treat maritime cases as cases arising
under federal law is expressly recognized. 358 U.S. at 379." Currie, supra note 21, at 12 n.42.
30. Supra note 28, at 545-46. (Emphasis added.)
31. 358 U.S. at 368-69.
32. See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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The Court then observed that until a 1950 dictum in Jansson v.
Swedish Am. Line,8" judges, lawyers, and scholars had made the "un-
questioned assumption" that nonstatutory maritime claims were not em-
braced within section 1331.4 As will be shown in the next section, the
opposite has been assumed by most authorities where statutory maritime
causes have been concerned.
Justice Frankfurter next noted the "important difficulties of judicial
policy" which would result from a contrary interpretation of section 1331.
If maritime cases were within the jurisdiction conferred by this statute
the "historic option of a maritime suitor pursuing a common law remedy
to select his forum, state or federal, would be taken away" because then
under section 1441 of the Judicial Code these cases could be removed from
state to federal courts. Consequently, inroads would be made into the con-
current jurisdiction of state courts in admiralty matters, which was
preserved by the saving of clause of 1789.5 This result would not follow
a holding that statutory maritime claims were covered by the grant of
section 1331 because most federal maritime statutes specify the courts
in which actions under them may be brought.86
Justice Frankfurter then contended that if maritime actions were
held within the grant of section 1331 federal courts would frequently
be called upon to determine whether a given maritime action was based
on state or federal law, since states can "supplement" the maritime law.
This was considered undesirable because "determinations of this nature
are among the most difficult and subtle that federal courts are called upon
to make."87 For obvious reasons this objection does not apply to maritime
claims arising under federal statutes.
Finally, the Court reasoned that if nonstatutory maritime actions
were held within section 1331, then, by virtue of section 1391(b) of the
Judicial Code, more restrictive venue requirements would apply in saving
clause cases wherein diversity of citizenship exists. Thus, litigants in such
cases would be hindered in their search for a federal forum."8 Most federal
maritime statutes, however, have their own venue requirements, thus ob-
viating this result where statutory maritime claims are concerned.89
33. 185 F.2d 212, 217-18 (1st Cir. 1950).
34. 358 U.S. at 369.
35. Id. at 371-72. The seriousness of these consequences was questioned by Justice
Brennan in his dissent. See generally Currie, supra note 21.
36. See, e.g., the Death on the High Seas Act,.46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1958). Jones Act
cases are not removable. Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., 193 F.2d 498, 1952 Am. Mar.
Cas. 287 (5th Cir. 1952).
37. 358 U.S. at 375.
38. 358 U.S. at 377. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), where jurisdiction is not founded
solely on diversity of citizenship the action can be brought only where all defendants reside.
Under § 1391(a), when diversity is the sole jurisdictional basis, the case can be brought
"where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside." 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1958).
39. See, e.g., the Death on the High Seas Act, supra note 36.
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In conclusion, the Court's treatment of the Jones Act claims in-
volved, in no way implies that statutory maritime claims are excluded
from the grant of section 1331. Moreover, most of the reasons advanced
by the Court in support of its holding that section 1331 does not confer
jurisdiction over nonstatutory maritime claims would not require a
similar holding with respect to statutory maritime actions. The arguments
of the Court which would suggest such a holding are counterbalanced by
arguments of equal persuasion. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that
Justice Frankfurter's use of broad language was inadvertent and not in-
tended to imply that maritime claims based on federal statutes are with-
out the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331."a
III. THE JONES ACT CASES
One of the most important federal statutes modifying the general
maritime law is the Jones Act.4 It gives seamen actions against their
employers for negligent acts resulting in personal injuries and is fre-
quently invoked. 1 Jones Act cases, therefore, can be expected to aid in
answering the question presented.
Unfortunately, the courts have disagreed as to the jurisdictional
basis of a Jones Act claim brought on the common-law side of a federal
district court. Some of the interpretations advanced are clearly erroneous,
reflecting a basic misunderstanding of the Jones Act. Others, though more
defensible, seem incorrect. Finally, one line of authority is both per-
suasive and widely supported. While considering these conflicting opin-
ions our principal question should be kept firmly in mind: Did Congress
intend in section 1331 to confer jurisdiction on district courts over mari-
time causes based on federal statutes?
The first important case to consider the jurisdictional requirements
of a Jones Act claim was Panama R.R. v. Johnson.42 In that case, plain-
tiff brought suit for negligence under the Jones Act on the common-law
side of a federal district court located outside the district of the defend-
ant's residence or principal office. The defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction under the concluding provision of the
Jones Act, which states: "Jurisdiction of such actions shall be under the
39a. In the recent case of Devlin v. Flying Tiger Lines, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 924, 925
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), the district court viewed the Romero holding concerning § 1331 as
applying only to nonstatutory maritime claims, by stating that:
The action instituted in the New York State court is based upon the Federal
Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 761 et seq. Thus, this is not a problem
of jurisdiction of a tort action arising under the general maritime law of the
United States cf. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co. ...
It is clear that this court would have had original jurisdiction of the matter,
for the case arises under the laws of the United States, and so satisfies the removal
requirements of § 1441(b).
40. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958). See supra note 18.
41. See generally GiLMORE & BLACK ch. VI.
42. 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
1963]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which
his principal office is located." The district court held that this provision
established only a venue requirement, which had been waived by defend-
ant's general appearance. The jury returned a -verdict for the plaintiff
and judgment was entered thereon. There followed an affirmance by the
court of appeals.
In the Supreme Court the defendant made two arguments: (1) The
above-quoted provision of the Jones Act deprived the district court of
jurisdiction; and (2) The Jones Act was unconstitutional because it was
in conflict with section 2 of Article III of the Constitution, which extends
the judicial power of the United States to "all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction."
On the first issue the Court held that the district court had jurisdic-
tion because "the case arose under a law of the United States and involved
the requisite amount, if any was requisite."4 The Court further held
that the above-quoted provision of the Jones Act referred only to venue.
The second issue was more involved. The defendant argued that
Congress in the Jones Act had withdrawn a maritime cause of action from
the admiralty jurisdiction conferred on federal courts by section 2 of
Article III of the Constitution. The argument was twofold. First, in apply-
ing to Jones Act cases statutes modifying or extending the common-law
rights and remedies of railroad employees in personal injury cases, Con-
gress had withdrawn a maritime cause from the reach of the maritime
law, which section 2 of Article III required to be applied in maritime
cases. Second, the Jones Act gave a remedy only at law, thereby depriv-
ing the federal courts of admiralty jurisdiction over this type of mari-
time claim.
The Court rejected both contentions. Answering defendant's first
objection, the Court replied:
Rightly understood the statute neither withdraws injuries to
seamen from the reach and operation of the maritime law, nor
43. Id. at 383-84. In support of its statement that the case arose under a law of the
United States, the Court cited the first subdivision of § 24 of the Judicial Code, 36 Stat.
1091 (1911), which conferred original jurisdiction on federal district courts "where the
matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of three
thousand dollars, and (a) arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or
treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority . . . ." It is difficult to
determine the source of the Court's doubt on the question of jurisdictional amount. In its
footnote citing the above provision, the Court also referred to the third subdivision of the
Judicial Code, which conferred on federal courts exclusive admiralty jurisdiction, saving
to suitors the right of a common-law remedy. The Court thereby indicated that the case
fell within the saving clause. It is possible that the Court doubted whether a saving clause
case based on a federal statute was subject to the jurisdictional amount required in the
first subdivision. The source of such doubt could have been the concluding provision of
the first subdivision of § 24, which stated: "Provided, however, That the foregoing provi-
sion as to the sum or value of the matter in controversy shall not be construed to apply
to any of the cases mentioned in the succeeding paragraphs of this section."
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enables the seamen to do so. On the contrary, it brings into that
law new rules drawn from another system and extends to in-
jured seamen a right to invoke, at their election, either the re-
lief accorded by the old rules or that provided by the new rules."
The Court further held that Congress could, consistent with section 2 of
Acticle III, permit federal courts to enforce maritime rights "on the
common-law side of the courts-that is to say, through proceedings in
personam according to the course of the common law."
'45
The Court rejected defendant's second argument on the grounds that
Congress in the Jones Act did not intend to exclude actions under it from
the district court's admiralty jurisdiction; Jones Act cases could be
brought in admiralty.
In short, the Johnson case established that a Jones Act claim is based
on federal maritime law and can be brought in district courts in admiralty
under the Congressional grant of admiralty jurisdiction or at law under
what is now section 1331. The Court apparently did not decide whether
any jurisdictional amount is required when a Jones Act case is brought
at law.
The holding of the Johnson case that Jones Act cases arise under
a law of the United States within the meaning of what is now section 1331
of the Judicial Code is both simple and sound. The Jones Act is un-
questionably a "law" of the United States in any generic sense of the
term. In addition, no overriding policy or precedent exists which requires
exclusion of Jones Act cases from the grant of section 1331. Therefore,
this holding in Johnson was based on sound principles of statutory con-
struction.
For some unknown reason, the Johnson case has not been relied on
in subsequent cases to support the proposition that Jones Act cases
brought at law are within the jurisdiction granted by section 1331. Never-
theless, as will be shown, the great majority of cases decided after John-
son have agreed with its interpretation of section 1331 and the Jones Act.
The next cases to adumbrate the jurisdictional basis of a Jones Act
claim were a pair of Supreme Court decisions handed down in the same
term in 1926. In Engel v. Davenport,46 the Court held that a Jones Act
claim could be brought, under the saving clause, in state courts. In re-
sponse to vigorous argument, the Court reconsidered the question in
Panama R.R. v. Vasquez.47 In affirming its holding in Engel, the Court
declared:
[A]n action in personam to recover damages for tort is one of
44. 264 U.s. at 388.
45. Ibid.
46. 271 U.S. 33, 37 (1926).
47. 271 U.S. 557 (1926).
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the most familiar of the common-law remedies; and it is such
a remedy at law that is contemplated by amended sec. 20 of
the Seamen's Act and invoked in this case.
The defendant insists that the saving clause refers only to
rights recognized by the maritime law as existing in 1789, when
the clause first was adopted, and therefore does not include
rights brought into the maritime law by subsequent legislative
changes. We think the clause has a broader meaning, looks to
the future as well as the past and includes new as well as old
rights, if only they are such as readily admit of assertion and
enforcement in actions in personam according to the course of
the common law.
48
Jones Act cases, therefore, are saving clause cases.
The first case to discuss whether the jurisdictional amount required
by section 1331 was necessary in a Jones Act case brought at law was
Rowley v. Sierra S.S. Co.41 There, without citing the Johnson case as
authority, the court held that a Jones Act claim arises under a law of the
United States within the meaning of section 1331 and therefore the juris-
dictional amount provided in that statute is required. The court speci-
fically rejected the argument that the Jones Act itself granted juris-
diction at law irrespective of jurisdictional amount.
The Rowley case confirmed the basic holding in Johnson that Jones
Act cases arise under a "law of the United States" and added the logical
corollary that such cases are subject to the jurisdictional amount of sec-
tion 1331.
The combined holdings of Johnson, Vasquez, and Rowley establish
the following proposition: A Jones Act case is a saving clause case which
can be brought at law in a federal district court under section 1331 of the
Judicial Code.
That this proposition is sound is attested by the fact that the vast
majority of cases decided subsequent to Rowley and dealing with the
issue involved have held that Jones Act cases can be brought at law under
section 1331 if the requirements of that statute are complied with.5"
48. Id. at 561.
49. 48 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ohio 1942), criticized in 56 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1943).
In a memorandum decision the court in Christianson v. Luckenback S.S. Co., 1941 Am.
Mar. Cas. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) held that the jurisdictional amount in § 1331 was required
in a Jones Act case brought at law.
50. Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1959) ; Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships,
Inc., 263 F.2d 437, 443 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Turner v. Wilson Line of Mass., Inc., 242 F.2d 414,
417 (Ist Cir. 1957); Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662, 669 (3d Cir. 1950); McCarthy v.
American E. Corp., 175 F.2d 724, 727 (3d Cir. 1949); Mullen v. Fitz Simons & Connell
Dredge & Dock Co., 172 F.2d 601, 603 (7th Cir. 1949); O'Neill v. Cunard White Star,
160 F.2d 446, 447 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 773 (1947) ; Branic v. Wheeling Steel
Corp., 152 F.2d 887, 890 (3d Cir. 1946); Jenkins v. Roderick, 156 F. Supp. 299, 300 (D.
Mass. 1957); Nilsson v. American Oil Co., 118 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Tex. 1954).
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Moreover, most of the leading authorities who have considered the
problem have assumed that Jones Act cases are within the jurisdictional
grant of section 133 1."
Finally, and most important of all, Congress has specifically in-
dicated that it considers section 1331 as extending to cases arising under
the Jones Act. Both the House and Senate Reports on the 1958 amend-
ments to section 1331 expressly state that Jones Act cases are within the
jurisdiction conferred by this statute and subject to its jurisdictional
amount.52 The issue, therefore, should be considered settled.53
Another line of authority, however, has accepted the view specifically
rejected in Rowley and contends that the Jones Act itself confers juris-
diction at law regardless of jurisdictional amount. Professor Moore, the
leading proponent of the this position, states:
The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. sec. 688 makes the Federal Employers'
Liability Act generally applicable and provides: "Jurisdiction in
such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the
defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is
located." The simplest view is that this covers both venue and
jurisdiction, and as to the latter gives the federal district court
jurisdiction, as it has under the FELA, irrespective of the
amount involved or the character of the parties. 4
The difficulty with Moore's position is that it seems to contradict the
holding in Panama R.R. v. Johnson55 that the Jones Act provision relied
on refers solely to venue and is therefore without jurisdictional signific-
ance.
56
51. Currie, supra note 7; GILMORE & BLACK § 6-62; HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 786 (1953); 2 NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN, § 667
(1952) (with cumulative supplement); Kurland, supra note 4; MCCORMICK, CHADBOURN &
WRIGHT, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 73 n.2 (4th ed. 1962); Friedenthal, New Limitations on Fed-
eral Jurisdiction, 11 STAN. L. REV. 213, 217-18 (1959).
52. H. R. REP. No. 1706, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1958); SEN. REP. No. 1830, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess., 1958; 1958 U.S. ConE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3099, 3103.
53. But, that doubt still exists on this issue, see Cooper v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 199
F. Supp. 655, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). An authoritative textbook states: "Indeed the Jones
Act cases may be regarded as an anomaly about which the final word has not been spoken."
MCCORMICK, CHADBOURN & WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 51.
54. 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE fr 38.35(4) n.19 (1951) (with cumulative supplement).
See also 4 BENEDICT, ADamIRALTY § 612 (Cum. Supp. at 42, 1963). Moore has reaffirmed his
position in MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE RULES AND OFFICIAL FORMAS 1118 (1961).
55. 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
56. As quoted above, text with note 54 supra, Professor Moore also believes that a
provision in the Federal Employers' Liability Act, similar to the Jones Act provision in
question, serves both as a venue and as a jurisdictional grant to federal district courts.
See also 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 622 (1961). This interpretation with respect to the
FELA has been expressly rejected in Imm v. Union R.R., 289 F.2d 858, 859 (3d Cir.
1961), in which the court stated:
The defendant makes two points. The first has to do with Section 6 of the FELA
which provides that: "an action may be brought in a district court of the United
States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of
19631
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Several cases appear to support Moore's position. In Kuhlman v.
W. & A. Fletcher Co.,5" the court held that the Jones Act provision relied
on by Moore conferred jurisdiction at law on the district court irrespec-
tive of diversity of citizenship. The court, however, was not faced with the
question of jurisdictional amount and did not refer to the construction
placed on the provision in question by the Johnson case.
The Kuhlman case was cited in Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. Nor-
dyke,55 a case relied upon by Moore. This case reveals the confusion that
has plagued so many courts in dealing with the jurisdictional basis of
actions under the Jones Act. The plaintiff in Van Camp brought an action
in two counts under the Jones Act on the law side of a federal district
court. The first count alleged damages in the sum of $15,000; the second
count was for less than $3,000. Defendant contended that since there was
no diversity of citizenship the court had no jurisdiction at law. The court
rejected defendant's contention, seemingly finding jurisdiction at law
under the concluding provision in the Jones Act. The court then stated:
The complaint alleged and demanded general damages in the
sum of $15,000, and the method adopted by the seaman of
pleading the aggregate of additional special damages in the
second cause of action at an amount not in excess of $3,000 in
no manner impaired the jurisdiction of the District Court under
the Jones Act to, as was done in the court below, hear and deter-
mine the whole case.5"
In support of this latter holding the court cited cases stating that a
claim for maintenance and cure could be heard at law, absent diversity,
when joined with an action under the Jones Act. The court, therefore,
must have felt that the jurisdictional amount required by section 1331
was applicable in Jones Act cases. This conclusion is fortified by the fact
action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of
commencing such action . . . ." 45 U.S.C.A. sec. 56. The railroad contends that
this is a venue provision and does not have anything to do with jurisdiction. It
was called a venue provision by the Supreme Court in Baltimore & O.R. Co. v.
Kepner . . . 314 U.S. 44 .... The legislative history furnished us by the appellant's
careful research and discussed in the case just cited shows pretty clearly that what
Congress had in mind was an amendment to the statute following the decision
of Cound v. Atchison . . . 173 F. 527. The holding of the Court in that case
required an injured plaintiff to sue his employer in the state of incorporation,
an obvious hardship in some cases. So we agree with the appellant that Section
6 is a venue provision only even though very eminent authority has implied it
has wider significance. [Citing HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEx 730, 731 n.39 (1953).]
Congress has, on occasion, conferred on federal district courts jurisdiction at law over
claims related to maritime matters irrespective of diversity of citizenship or jurisdictional
amount. See, e.g., the Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. § 911, 941(c), 951 (1958).
57. 20 F.2d 465, 467-68 (3d Cir. 1927).
58. 140 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1944).
59. Id. at 905.
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that a subsequent case cited Van Camp as authority for the proposition
that a Jones Act case falls within section 1331.60
Most of the remaining cases which could be cited in support of
Moore's "special grant" theory did not deal specifically with the question
of jurisdictional amount.6 ' Some of them reveal the same confusion
that is evident in Van Camp. 2 On the whole these cases provide tenuous
support for Professor Moore's interpretation.
A third line of authority appears to hold that even when brought
"at law" a Jones Act claim is tried under the district court's admiralty
jurisdiction. This theory was advanced in a casenote in the Harvard Law
Review in 1943.63 More recently, Judge Dimock in his concurring opin-
ion in Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha64seems to adopt
this position.
Though they do not say so explicitly, these authorities appear to
feel that the Jones Act is similar in effect to the Great Lakes Act,6" which
amended the procedure in admiralty to provide for the right of jury trial
in certain specified cases.
One of the two cases cited for support in the Harvard casenote does
not, it is contended, sustain its position. In Sevin v. Inland Waterways
Corp.,66 nothing more was meant than that a Jones Act claim, whether
brought at law or in admiralty, was based on maritime law. This case
was simply stating a fact made clear in the Johnson case.
67
The other case cited by the casenote, however, does tenuously sup-
port its theory. In McMenamin v. McCormick S.S. Co.,"s the court
seemed to hold that even when brought "at law" a Jones Act case is
heard under the court's admiralty jurisdiction. The court apparently
failed to recognize that a maritime claim, when brought at law and sup-
60. Mullen v. Fitz Simons & Connell Dredge & Dock Co., 172 F.2d 601, 603 (7th Cir.
1949).
61. See Linquist v. Dilkes, 127 F.2d 21, 25 (3d Cir. 1941) (indicated special grant in
Jones Act but on theory different from Moore's); McDonald v. Cape Cod Trawling Corp.,
71 F. Supp. 888, 890 (D. Mass. 1947); Ritchie v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 7 F.R.D. 671 (D.
N.J. 1947) (through quoting from Van Camp, the court seemed to hold that the Jones
Act claim was brought under § 1331) ; Serbokov v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 37 F. Supp.
411 (W.D.N.Y. 1941) (a cryptic opinion which seemed to hold that no jurisdictional
amount was required in a Jones Act case brought at law).
62. See, e.g., Ritchie v. Atlantic Ref. Co., supra note 61.
63. 56 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1943).
64. 221 F.2d 615, 619 (2d Cir. 1955).
65. 28 U.S.C § 1873 (1958).
66. 88 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1937).
67. The court in Mullen v. Eastern Transp. Co., 25 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. Pa. 1938) also
used ambiguous language which might lead one to conclude that the court believed that
claims under the Jones Act brought at law were within the district court's admiralty
jurisdiction. A scrutiny of the whole opinion, however, reveals that the court meant
only that a Jones Act case is based on maritime law.
68. 37 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1941).
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ported by nonadmiralty grounds of jurisdiction is tried under the dis-
trict court's common-law jurisdiction.
Judge Dimock, in his concurring opinion in Paduano, appears to
support the proposition that Jones Act claims brought "at law" are tried
under the district court's admiralty jurisdiction. In Paduano he stated:
These words "civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion" undoubtedly had the same meaning as the words in Article
III, section 2 of the Constitution, "all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction." The effect of the decision in Panama
R.R. Co. v. Johnson ... is that those words embrace not only
maritime remedies to enforce maritime substantive law but com-
mon law remedies to enforce maritime substantive law.69
A reading of the whole opinion reveals that by "common law remedy"
Judge Dimock was referring to the right of jury trial, although strictly
speaking, the right of jury trial is not a remedy but a procedural matter.
He reads Johnson as holding that the district courts' admiralty jurisdic-
tion is broad enough to permit the enforcement of the maritime sub-
stantive law by common-law remedies and that a Jones Act claim is en-
forced in admiralty even when a jury trial is permitted.
The Johnson case, it is submitted, did not hold as Judge Dimock in-
terpreted it. What Johnson held was that Jones Act claims could be
brought in admiralty under the district courts' admiralty jurisdiction,
but that when such a claim is brought at law it is heard under the district
courts' common-law jurisdiction conferred by what is now section 1331 of
the Judicial Code.70
A fourth position concerning the jurisdictional requirements in a
Jones Act case was adopted in Lima v. A. L. Burbank & Co.7 In that
case plaintiff brought an action under the Jones Act on the law side of
the district court, alleging damages in excess of 3,000 dollars. The court
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, holding that diversity
of citizenship was necessary to bring a Jones Act claim at law. In sup-
port of its holding the court cited, inter alia, Erlich v. Wilhelmsen,72 a
case which used broad language as to the necessity of diversity in saving
69. 221 F.2d at 620.
70. That there is nothing in logic which dictates that an admiralty case must fall
exclusively within the district court's admiralty jurisdiction was amply shown by Justice
Brennan in his dissenting opinion in Romero, in which he stated:
A matter affecting an ambassador or a consul is not per se an action "arising
under" just as it is not per se a maritime action. But could not a case involving
a consul be also a case of admiralty jurisdiction under certain fact situations?
And could not a suit by or against a consul happen, perchance, to be also one
"arising under"? The fact that the jurisdictional categories are separate and
distinct, as Marshall demonstrates, does not mean that a particular action could
not come under the heading of more than one of them. 358 U.S. at 403.
71. 69 F. Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
72. 44 F. Supp. 414 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
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clause cases brought at law, but which did not appear to involve the Jones
Act. Paradoxically, the court also cited the Rowley case 72a-one which
was directly olposed to its holding.
This case seems clearly wrong. There is nothing to indicate that
Congress intended to incorporate the requirement of diversity of citizen-
ship in the Jones Act.78 Realizing this, the courts have ignored the Lima
decision.
A fifth theory regarding the jurisdictional basis of a Jones Act case
was suggested recently in Imm v. Union R.R.,7 4 which held that no juris-
dictional amount was required in an FELA case because the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act was an act regulating commerce within the mean-
ing of section 1337 of the Judicial Code. The court reasoned that all
statutes based on Congress's commerce power fell within this statute.
In its concluding paragraph the court stated:
All that we are deciding in this case is that a suit under
the FELA is based upon a statute which is a regulation of
interstate commerce coming under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1337 and
that the jurisdictional amount of Section 1331 is not required.
The impact of Section 1337 on the Jones Act cases will be
considered when the problem presents itself.7"
If the above-suggested theory is advanced, it is believed that it
will be rejected. Although conceivably the commerce power could sup-
port the Jones Act, the usual interpretation is that it was enacted under
Congress's admiralty power derived from the judicial grant in section 2
of Article III and the "necessary and proper" clause in section 8 of
Article 1.76 This fact will probably persuade the courts that Congress
did not intend section 1337 to apply to Jones Act cases.
The holding in the Imm case could be used indirectly to support an
argument that no jurisdictional amount is required in Jones Act cases.
It might be argued that because the Jones Act incorporates by reference
the provisions of the FELA, Congress intended to place seamen in as
favorable a position as railroad workers. Since, under the Imm holding,
these workers may sue in federal courts without the requirement of
jurisdictional amount, seamen likewise should have this privilege. In
support of this position it could be observed that the same statute of
limitations applies to both classes of workers. 77 Further, the provision
in the FELA prohibiting removal from state to federal courts of suits
72a. Note 49 supra.
73. Kuhlman v. W. & A. Fletcher Co., 20 F.2d 465, 467-68 (3d Cir. 1927).
74. 289 F.2d 858 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 833 (1961).
75. 289 F.2d at 861.
76. See Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926); Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264
U.S. 375 (1924).
77. GiLmoRE & BrAcx at 299.
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by railroad employees under the act has been held to have been incor-
porated into the Jones Act, thereby conferring on seamen the same
benefit.78
Ironically, the holding in the Imm case can also be used to defeat
this argument. The counter argument would be that federal jurisdiction
over a claim under the FELA is based not upon a provision contained
in that act but upon a separate statute, section 1337 of the Judicial Code.
Therefore, there is no jurisdictional provision in the FELA capable
of being incorporated into the Jones Act. Speaking practically, the
courts will probably be unwilling to proliferate further the various
theories regarding the jurisdictional basis of a Jones Act case.
In summary, of the authorities discussed in this section, only Judge
Dimock appears to reject the proposition that maritime claims arising
under federal statutes are within the jurisdiction conferred by sec-
tion 1331 of the Judicial Code. Professor Moore's position that the
Jones Act contains a special grant of jurisdiction at law does not, in
itself, contravene the above proposition. The Harvard casenote can
be fairly regarded to concern only the desirability of interpreting the
Jones Act as not requiring any jurisdictional amount when cases arising
under it are brought at law. The Lima decision, which required diversity
of citizenship in Jones Act cases brought at law, can at best be con-
sidered a holding that Congress intended this result when passing the
Jones Act. And the holding in the Imm case that FELA cases arise
under section 1337 of the Judicial Code, with the implication that the
same might be true in Jones Act cases, supports, rather than rejects, the
position that claims under the Jones Act arise under a law of the United
States for purposes of federal jurisdiction.
IV. CASES UNDER OTHER FEDERAL MARITIME STATUTES
In addition to the cases under the Jones Act, several cases involving
actions under other federal maritime statutes sustain the contention that
statutory maritime claims are within the district courts' general federal
question jurisdiction.
In Crispin Co. v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co.,"9 the plaintiff brought suit
in a state court under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ° to recover for
damage to a shipment of burlap which the defendant transported by one
of its vessels. The defendant removed the action to a federal district
court and the plaintiff made a motion to remand the case to the state
court, on the grounds that a saving clause case could not be removed.
The district court denied the plaintiff's motion, holding that the Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act was an "act of Congress regulating com-
78. Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., 193 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1952).
79. 134 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Tex. 1955).
80. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1958).
[VOL.. XVIII
COMMENTS
merce" within the meaning of section 1337 of the Judicial Code and
that the saving clause affords litigants a choice of remedies, not of
forums.8 The maritime nature of the claim, therefore, did not with-
draw it from the court's federal question jurisdiction.
In O'Neill v. Cunard White Star,82 Judge Learned Hand held in
effect, that both the Jones Act and the Death on the High Seas Act were
"laws of the United States" within section 1331. He stated this holding
as follows:
Although the district court did not have substantive jurisdiction
over the claim by reason of diverse citizenship, since it is based
upon the Jones Act and the "Wrongful Death Act," it "arises"
under the "laws of the United States. 8
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 4
was held to be a "law of the United States" within section 1331 in City
Stores Co. v. Shull.06 Although the case involved a statute making the
Longshoremen's Act applicable in the District of Columbia, the court
based its jurisdiction over the case on the grounds that the Longshore-
men's Act was a law of the United States within section 1331.
At first blush, Leonard v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.86 might seem con-
trary to City Stores. In Leonard, plaintiff sought a declaratory judg-
ment, asking the federal district court to declare the rights, duties, and
obligations of the plaintiff and defendant under the Longshoremen's Act.
Concerning its jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the court stated:
We have also examined whether or not the jurisdictional amount
of $3,000 or more is necessary to sustain the jurisdiction of this
court. Since the instant case primarily comes under the
admiralty or maritime law, it is our conclusion that jurisdiction
is derived through Article III, section 2 of the Federal Con-
stitution and 28 U.S.C.A. sec. 1333(1). The Court having
exclusive admiralty jurisdiction, no specific amount in con-
troversy is necessary. 7
This statement might be thought to support the view that cases under
the Longshoremen's Act do not fall within section 1331. Probably all the
court meant, however, was that it chose to treat plaintiff's claim as having
been filed in admiralty.88
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958) confers original jurisdiction on federal courts over
cases arising under acts of Congress regulating commerce.
82. 160 F.2d 446 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 773 (1947).
83. 160 F.2d at 447. See also Turner v. Wilson Line of Mass., Inc., 242 F.2d 414,
418 (1st Cir. 1957).
84. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1958). See generally GnLmoaE & BlAcK ch. VI.
85. 161 F. Supp. 459, 465 (D. Md. 1958).
86. 165 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
87. Id. at 157.
88. Other cases which seem to support the view that federal statutes affecting mar-
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V. CONCLUSION
By using broad language in holding that claims based on the general
maritime law were not cognizable in federal courts under section 1331
of the Judicial Code, the Supreme Court in Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co. created doubt as to whether the jurisdiction con-
ferred by this statute extended to maritime claims based on federal
statutes. A close analysis of the opinion, however, reveals that Romero
cannot be considered authority for excluding statutory maritime claims
from the jurisdictional grant of section 1331.
With the exception of a twenty-year-old casenote and possibly
Judge Dimock's concurring opinion in the Paduano case, there seems
to be no authority for excluding maritime claims based on acts of
Congress from the jurisdictional grant of section 1331 of the Judicial
Code. Most of the leading cases and most of the commentators have
held that actions based on the Jones Act are cognizable under section 1331.
In addition, claims under other federal maritime statutes have been held
within the district courts' general federal question jurisdiction.
It is felt, therefore, that section 1331 of the Judicial Code should
be regarded as conferring jurisdiction on federal district courts over mari-
time claims based on acts of Congress.
time matters are "laws of the United States" within § 1331 include: Davis v. United
States Line Co., 153 F. Supp. 912, 914 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1957); American Cotton Oil Co. v.
United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 270 Fed. 296 (E.D. La. 1921);
Ingram Day Lumber Co. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 267
Fed. 283 (S.D. Miss. 1920).
